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Using stock market return data from 2007 to 2019 from The Center for Research in 
Security Prices, I inquire into the impact that Twitter has on the overreactions of individual stock 
returns by breaking down returns into pre and post-Twitter periods. I examine negative serial 
correlation, demonstrating return reversals, between a lag crossed Twitter dummy variable and 
initial returns. With stock reversals serving as an indicator of initial overreaction and assuming 
stationarity of overreactions over time, I find that the presence of Twitter results in significantly 
more overreactions for highly followed companies when using monthly returns. However, when 
assessing Twitter’s influence using weekly returns, the results suggest the possibility of return 
momentum. Similarly, Twitter’s influence on overreaction is a highlighted when evaluating only 
negatively or positively large returns, producing greater significance despite a decrease sample 
size. While these promising results are not economically significant and thus do not reveal a 
viable contrarian investment strategy, my paper lays the foundation for a predictive model based 













Table of Contents 


























Twitter has appeared in the forefront of how politicians communicate with their 
constituents, companies communicate with their shareholders and customers, and how the people 
and major media gather news. As such, Twitter is a reasonable measure of broad social media 
following and retail investor interest which in turn may impact the stock market. The question is 
how it will impact the stock market. While I do not doubt the ability for professionals to 
correctly analyze and use Twitter breaking news, which appears in waves and consensus of 
retweets, retail investors may lack this expertise, especially considering that Twitter is an 
information pushing platform. Though increased information is supposed to enhance market 
efficiency, the unreliable sources on Twitter and the false consensus that Twitter depicts through 
the wave of information it pushes, may decrease market efficiency. Hence, I argue that 
companies with large social media audiences should experience overreactions in their returns, 
because of unreliable information, pseudo-consensus, and social media’s retail investor audience. 
Examining the literature regarding market inefficiencies, Shleifer and Summers (1990) 
discuss how “noise traders” who rely on pseudo-signals, have a herded reaction which 
contributes to irrational shifts in the market that are not compensated for by arbitrageurs. Barber, 
Odeon, and Zhu (2009) connect these ideas with retail investors, demonstrating their ability to 
affect individual stock returns and produce subsequent rebounds. Shifting gears towards social 
media, Antweiller and Frank (2007) demonstrate that internet message boards help predict 
returns and volatility of the market, while Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011) and Sul, Dennis, Yuan 
(2014) illustrate social-media-predicted returns can originate simply from general emotional 




are inefficient and caused partially by investor reaction to stale information. Despite the breadth 
of the current literature, it fails to address how social media impacts individual stocks. 
This paper connects the literature on retail investor overreaction on particular stocks and 
broad market overreaction due to social media.  By examining if Twitter causes overreaction 
amongst its most followed brands, I fill in the gap that represents the cross-section of these two 
topics. Specifically, I test Twitter’s impact on individual stocks, attempting to demonstrate a 
causal relationship that could be subject to arbitrage. Furthermore, I also examine whether this 
overreaction is more prevalent in large stock shifts in particular, which other papers do not 
specifically test. The next logical steps of future studies, on the condition that this study yields 
significant findings, would be research that examines if trending news on social media causes 
overreaction as well.  
In order to fill in the gaps and expand previous literature, I examine 19 of the 50 most 
followed brands on Twitter from 2007 to the end of 2019. I regress the returns of the current 
period on the previous period, creating a lag variable. This study focuses on a Twitter dummy 
variable(crossed with the initial lag returns) in order to demonstrate that after these companies 
became popular on Twitter their returns in the next period are predictable through overreactions. 
In a separate regression, I use the same methods; however with only monthly stock shifts greater 
than (+/-) 0.1. 
Through testing multiple dates to signify the start of the Twitter period, I find that the 
monthly returns of the most followed companies, with respect to their previous returns, are 
significantly negatively affected by Twitter’s rising influence in 2013, especially when large 
return shifts are isolated. Therefore, after Twitter, these companies are more prone to 




return momentum when returns were analyzed weekly. My findings are consistent with the 
pattern of individual stock reversals in Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009).  
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section II discusses the development and 
execution of my hypothesis. I then address the previous literature that can be connected with the 
potential impact that social media may have on individual stock returns in Section III. The 
literature review section is essentially split into two parts, addressing how individual stock 
returns are affected by retail investor overreaction and social media’s inefficient impact on the 
market in general. Section IV outlines the data: stock market returns, company sizes and retail 
investor percentage data from the beginning of 2007 to the end of 2019 from Wharton Research 
Data Services for 19 different companies. The empirical strategy and results are presented in 
Section V and VI.  Section VII conveys information about unincluded tests run for robustness. 
















In this paper my testable hypothesis remains that companies with large Twitter audiences 
should experience more overreactions in their stock returns than before Twitter’s popularity. In 
order to measure overreactions, I test for serial correlation. In the event that I discover 
significantly negative serial correlation compared to the before Twitter period, this indicates that 
Twitter stocks have become more susceptible to stock reversals. Consistent, or the significant 
presence of, reversals would signal that these stocks are regularly overreacting and then 
correcting in the post-Twitter period.  
This testable hypothesis originates from a broader hypothesis that Twitter causes 
overreactions in individual stocks. I also believe that companies with large Twitter audiences 
should experience more overreactions in their returns than those that have small Twitter 
audiences. Furthermore, companies that commonly trend on Twitter should also experience 
overreactions. However, testing the effects of large versus small Twitter audiences and the 
effects of trending on Twitter is rather difficult. These limitations for testing my broader 
hypothesis are discussed more extensively in the concluding section. Therefore, in order to 
examine the possible impact that Twitter could have towards individual stock overreactions, this 
paper compares the degree of overreactions before and after Twitter’s rise to popularity.  
I argue that Twitter’s propensity for spreading, or almost pushing information, leads 
investors to rely on pseudo-signals and believe in a false consensus regarding a company’s future 
stock returns. Thus, I do not believe that it is only Twitter following that causes overreaction, but 
also company interests across the Twittersphere; however, I think that Twitter following acts as a 
proxy for broad company interest on Twitter. It is with this belief in mind, that I also think that 




stock shifts only. To explain, these large shifts most likely occur with greater Twitter buzz 
surrounding the highly followed company. 
Nevertheless, when attempting to prove my testable hypothesis, I assume that if 
popularized companies experience more overreactions after Twitter than before, this indicates 
that Twitter causes these overreactions. However, this does not take into account the possibility 
of time-based effects, but instead assumes stationarity in the amount of overreaction in the 
market. In order to corroborate my assumption of overreaction stationarity, I turn to 
Jegadeesh(1989). Jegadeesh(1989) tests for negative serial correlation in stock returns by 
assembling a contrarian portfolio for the months between 1934 and 1987, finding significant 
evidence of overreactions. More importantly for my corroborating my assumptions, 
Jegadeesh(1989) finds a similar amount of serial correlation across subperiods of 1934 to 1987. 
Consistent with other literature on monthly returns, these historic results substantiate my claim 
that any major difference in serial correlation between 2007 and 2019 results from Twitter’s 













III. Literature Review 
In their influential paper, Shleifer and Summers (1990) revisit the efficient markets 
approach and present a case for inefficient markets, citing “noise traders”. Their approach 
incorporates two main assumptions. First, the authors argue that not all market demand changes 
are rational. The beliefs and sentiments of these investors rest on spurious signals of future 
returns, such as the advice of brokers or financial gurus. The authors continue by arguing that 
experimental subjects are overconfident, chase trends, and rely too heavily on new information, 
respectively. The trading spurred by pseudo-signals is correlated and aggregated to form 
meaningful demand shifts; this contrasts with the null hypothesis which states that these trades 
should be random and cancel each other out. 
 Their second assumption argues that arbitrage, which involves trading by rational 
investors, does not entirely counter the inefficiencies caused by noise traders. They argue that the 
riskiness of arbitrage serves to limit it and its ability to direct markets towards efficiency. Their 
approach, noise traders/limited arbitrage, provides more accurate descriptions of the market and 
data-consistent implications about asset prices. Thus, they surmise that investor sentiment can 
shift prices away from fundamentals. 
 Parlaying off of Shleifer and Summers (1990) and its case for inefficient markets, Barber, 
Odeon, and Zhu (2009) address the idea that incorrect investor sentiment from pseudo-signals 
originates from retail trades. Thus, this begs the question if retail trades move markets, 
specifically in the direction of inefficiency. In order to incorporate retail trades into their model, 
the authors rationalize the use of small trade size as a proxy for individual investor trades. 
However, in order to appraise the effectiveness of this proxy, the authors evaluate the correlation 




investors at different brokers in the 1990s. Upon finding reliable correlation, the authors look at 
tick-by-tick transaction data from 1983 to 2001 from the ISSM and TAQ. 
The authors observe that, in addition to the correlation between small trades and 
individual investor trades, individual investing exhibits dependable evidence of herding. Though 
herding constitutes an indication of inefficiency alone, the researchers uncover that stocks 
heavily bought by individual investors earn strong returns the following week (or vice versa); 
this pattern persists for a few weeks and then reverses. Finally, stocks heavily bought by 
individual investors underperform heavily sold stocks by 4.4 percentage points the following 
year. The subsequent return reversals that accompany these individual investor favorites, 
establish the possibility for retail investor-oriented platforms to cause temporary market 
inefficiencies.  
Shifting gears, the following few sources serve to illustrate the effect that social media 
has on returns and the market in general, in order to lead the way for discussion and research on 
social media and its relationship to noise traders and inefficiency. As one of the foundations for 
research on social media’s impact on returns, Antweiller and Frank (2004) analyze internet stock 
messages across Yahoo Finance and Raging Bull in 2000. They compare these messages to 
financial data from the TAQ database of the 45 stocks that make up the DIA and XLK and an 
exchange-traded fund that served as a proxy for the market. Their hypothesis involves the ideas 
that the message volume and their bullishness predict returns or volatility and that disagreements 
between posts results in higher trading volume.  Through contemporaneous regressions, the 
study affirms that greater bullishness is significantly positively related to returns and message 
volume serves as an indicator of volatility for both the DIA and XLK, even when accounting for 




the argument that retail investors and social media (message posts) have significant impacts on 
the market, they do not indicate if this impact originates from efficient rational investing, such as 
decreased information asymmetry, and inefficient investing, such as that of noise investors. 
Antweiller and Frank’s work led to further research regarding social media’s impact on 
markets, examining if they detract or contribute to efficiency. Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011) 
assess if non-fundamental social media information affects returns. Through March 2009 and 
September 2009, the authors collect between 8100 and 43040 tweets per day. By measuring the 
emotional composition of these tweets, hope or fear, and comparing those sentiments to various 
indices, the researchers demonstrate significant correlations between the emotions of tweets and 
the DIA, S&P500, NASDAQ, and VIX. Thus, simply analyzing emotional developments on 
Twitter can be used as a predictor of future stock movement. While these results could indicate 
that non-fundamental information causes inefficient returns for the companies within these 
indices, the indices are also highly correlated with the overall movement of the market. Thus, 
public sentiment could be correlated with greater macroeconomic factors, meaning there could 
be no direct causation between tweet emotions and returns.  
 Building upon Zhang, Fuehres, Gloor (2011), alternative research corroborates the idea 
that emotional sentiment on Twitter has a legitimate causal relationship with market returns. Sul, 
Dennis, Yuan (2014) match emotional tweets about a firm specifically to the returns of that 
firm’s stock. Through analyzing tweets and stocks in the S&P 500 between March 2011 and 
February 2012, the researchers find significant evidence that overall emotional valence is related 
to a firm’s stock returns. Therefore Sul, Dennis, Yuan (2014) demonstrate that the correlation 
between public sentiment and macroeconomic factors does not account for the impact that 




comparisons for individual firms, the authors present a strong argument that irrational 
information could predict next day stock returns. However, to illustrate that the irrational impact 
that social media has on the markets is indeed inefficient, overreactions should be observable 
through return reversals. 
 Hence, related research also looks at the possibly inefficient relationship between the 
media and the stock market. Using General Inquirer to analyze the pessimism in the WSJ 
“Abreast of the Market” column from 1984 to 1999, Tetlock (2007) finds that pessimism not 
only precedes downward prices but also a subsequent reversal to the original “fundamentals”. In 
accordance with the assumption that reversals indicate initial inefficient movements, Tetlock’s 
tests confirm that the analyzed media information does not provide anything new regarding asset 
prices. However, Tetlock (2007) fails to describe why media sentiment predicts reversals, 
whether that be from unjustified indications of consensus, or saturation of topic news that would 
make pinpointing reliable or meaningful sources difficult. 
Accordingly, Tetlock (2010) later performs research that more closely lines up with the 
hypothesis of this paper. To clarify, he tries to pinpoint what mechanisms cause the inefficiency 
and reversals. Tetlock (2010) investigates if stock market investors are able to differentiate 
between new and old information. His study’s results provide significant evidence that while 
stocks react less to stale news (news that has cycled ten times), the reaction and reversal are 
statistically substantial. Therefore, Tetlock (2007; 2010) provides grounds and reasoning behind 
an inefficient market hypothesis due to the media.  
By connecting Barber, Odeon, and Zhu’s (2009) results regarding pseudo-signals and 
retail investor overreactions towards individual stocks, with Tetlock’s (2007; 2010) results 




explores a cross section, or gap, between these two branches of literature. Unlike Barber, Odeon, 
and Zhu (2009), this paper focuses on social media popularity as a particular cause of 
overreactions, and unlike Tetlock(2007; 2010), this paper tests if social media causes 
overreaction in individual stocks. As a general summary, by examining next period returns in 
comparison to previous period returns, before and after Twitter and for specific companies, this 
paper tests if Twitter popularity causes overreaction in its most popular stocks. Lastly, this paper 
also tests whether overreactions associated with Twitter are more prevalent within large return 
shifts. To the best of my knowledge, no literature has explicitly addressed this intersection, social 
media and individual stock overreaction, or if the individual stock overreaction from social 

















IV. Data  
The data I use for my analysis of overreactions in the stock market due to Twitter 
originates from CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices), provided by WRDS, from 
January 2007 to December 2019. This data period is optimal because it stretches early enough to 
account for a period before Twitter became popular/influential, allowing period comparisons. 
This forces me to include the volatility that originated from the 2008 Great Recession. However, 
based on the previously mentioned study, Jegadeesh(1989), looking at monthly data, there was a 
similar pattern of serial correlation from 1934 to 1987. Therefore, serial correlation or 
overreaction in the stock market seems to be fairly chronologically stationary. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that the increased volatility during 2008/2009 should not bias my 
regression results, but simply add to my sample size. Furthermore, CRSP’s available data 
restricts my analysis to the end of 2019.  
The initial scope of my data examines the 50 most followed brands, using live Twitter 
statistics from a social media tracker, SocialBakers. However, despite the original 50 companies 
considered, there are a number of restrictions for the companies that I could use to test my 
hypothesis, leaving my data to consist of the returns of 19 different companies rather than 50 for 
a regression. While I believe 19 companies is a small sample size, expanding the scope of my 
data to the top 100 or even 200 most followed brands could dilute the significance of my 
regressions. To explain, the number of followers of the 50th to the 100th most followed 
companies drops dramatically, and I would expect that Twitter’s impact on the stock of the 100th 
most followed company drops accordingly. 
Next, I will discuss the restrictions placed the companies included in my dataset. 




companies. Also, the remaining companies need to be widely traded and need enough historical 
data. I find it pertinent to only include stocks that are majorly traded on the NYSE to ensure 
adequate trade volume, maintain consistency in the data, guarantee retail activity (as opposed to 
OTC trades), and finally to keep the data within my US-centric analysis.  
Lastly, an important criterion for this study is that the stock has enough relevant data 
before Twitter’s influence appeared to produce an efficient sample size. Not only could newly 
created/IPO’d companies exhibit more overreaction and skew results, they also do not allow for 
this study’s period comparison. On that note, two of the 19 companies, Tesla and Michael Kors, 
do not have public data going back to 2007; however, they have enough data to be usable. In the 
end, the data consists of 19 different companies. Following these restrictions and analyzing stock 
returns by weekly and monthly periods, the sample sizes are 12,406 and 2,864, respectively. 
To explore Twitter as a potential cause of overreaction in the company stocks, I create a 
continuous variable that captures the stock returns of these companies measured either weekly or 
monthly. Previous literature has demonstrated that before stock reversals, there is often a period 
of continued momentum in which irrational stock returns persists. Thus in order to successfully 
detect investor overreactions, it is important to observe stock returns monthly and weekly. 
Returns are calculated as the change in the company’s stock over the week or month long period 
divided by the average stock price during that same period of time. Whereas the average stock 
price is the mean of the average between the bid and ask price of the stock. One of the primary 
independent variables in my dataset is lag returns, which is the returns of the previous week or 
month relative to current returns.  
Moving forward, in order to directly compare overreactions in these stocks before and 




variable equal to 1 if it is after 2010 and 0 if it is before 2010.  2010 represents a year of massive 
Twitter growth and usage milestones such as signing a 100 million new users in a given year. 
Because there is some debate over what the correct timing for the indicator variable should be, I 
create two analogous indicator variables for 2013 and 2016. 2013 marks a significant turning 
point for Twitter because Twitter performed its initial public offering in November 2013, gaining 
much wider public and media attention. 2016 signifies the year that Twitter gained extensive 
financial, economic, and most prominently political impact. 
 My data includes the market cap in billions as of December 31, 2019, of each of the 
companies in the regression, which I take the natural log of, to represent the natural log of firm 
size. Using market cap and the natural log in my regression is consistent with other literature. 
The percentage of each company owned by retail investors, as stated on CNN Business as of 
October 2020, represents another important control variable. Each of these two variables, size 
and retail percentage, are continuous across the companies included in my data; however, these 
variables are constant over time within each company within my dataset. 
 I present summary statistics by month and week in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  There 
are several noteworthy results.  Looking at monthly returns first, the returns of the before Twitter 
period are consistently lower than the returns of the after Twitter period, and they also have a 
larger standard deviation. The lower returns in the first major period are explained by the Great 
Recession and the slow recovery period, which also explains the volatility. The lower average 
returns is especially noticeable when compared to the positive returns experienced during the last 
10 years of bull market.  
Looking at weekly returns, the standard deviation of weekly returns in Table 2 are just as 




the other variables of Table 1 and 2, the mean size differs between the before and after Twitter 
period, even though size is kept constant over time for each company because of the few 
























V. Empirical Strategy 
To examine the possibility of overreactions in the stock market due to Twitter and retail 
investor activity, this study utilizes the following regression model:  
𝑌!"#,% = 𝛼 +	𝛽#𝑌!,% + 𝛽&𝑇𝑤% + 𝛽')𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑇𝑤%+ + 𝛿#𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒% + 𝛿&)𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒%+ + 𝛿'𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐%
+ 𝛿((𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐%) + 𝜀%,! 
where 𝑌!"#,% measures the returns in the period immediately after the initial period(t). 𝑌!,% 
represents the lag returns, that is, the returns in the period prior to 𝑌!"#,% . As stated, the returns 
of 𝑌!"#,%  and 𝑌!,% are grouped weekly or monthly depending on the regression specification. 𝑇𝑤% 
is the post-Twitter indicator variable, which categorizes the dataset into two main time periods, 
before and after Twitter. In separate regression specifications, 𝑇𝑤% indicates shifts after 2010, 
2013, and 2016, and the Twitter indicator variable is crossed with the lag returns, )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑇𝑤%+. 
The beta associated with the interaction variable is the main parameter of interest. Significant 
results would indicate that lag returns influence returns in the post-twitter period relative to the 
pre-twitter period. A positive coefficient demonstrates that heavily followed companies on 
Twitter exhibit momentum within their returns, while a negative coefficient exhibiting reversals, 
or overreactions. Though I suspect in population that a negative coefficient exists, detecting it 
may be difficult because I am unsure how long reversals normally occur after an initial 
overreaction. Thus, I have no priors on whether the coefficients will be positive or negative 
based on monthly and weekly returns. 
 Furthermore, for a separate regression, I only include previous period returns, 𝑌!,%, 
that are larger in absolute value than 0.1 for monthly returns. This threshold represents roughly 
the 10th and 90th percentiles of monthly stock returns. By specifically examining the relationship 




Twitter’s impact on stock returns is more or less noticeable in large movements. In other words, 
are large stock return shifts more likely to be the result of an overreaction from Twitter?  
Next, I explain the rationale and reasoning for the inclusion of the (S) size and retail 
percentage (RP) variables (in addition to crossing them with lag returns) in my regression 
framework. For some background information, a potentially prominent source of error that this 
study faces is how to account for subsidiaries in my regression. Because this paper focuses on 
how Twitter helps predict returns of the stock market in a future period, it is reasonable to 
assume that when a popular Twitter brand is only a subsidiary of a larger company, Twitter 
should not have as large of a relationship with the stock market movement. While data regarding 
each of these company’s subsidiaries is publicly available, the subsidiaries would need to be 
deeply analyzed in order to understand how to record the sensitivity of a parent organization’s 
stock to news on its subsidiary. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study. With this 
potentially unaccounted error in mind, my regression framework includes a firm size variable, 
𝑆%, and its cross with lag returns, )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑆%+. To explain, by identifying a company as extremely 
large, this could communicate that the popular brand on Twitter is part of a larger organization. 
The other variable with the potential to impact returns when crossed with lag returns is 
the percent of retail ownership for each of these companies, 𝑅𝑃% and )𝑌!,% ∗ 𝑅𝑃%+. I argue that 
Twitter, and even social media as a whole, causes overreactions in the stocks of its highly 
followed companies because it pushes information on retail investors. It is their lack of 
experience that could potentially cause retail investors to believe unreliable information, detect 
nonexistent stock trends, and overlook the relatively small hints of useful information. Therefore, 
companies that have high retail ownership should be more susceptible to overreaction. Because 




inclusion of this variable isolates the impact that social media has on the market from retail 
investor effects.  
Though I have not included variables in my regression framework that account for time-
based differences in the overreactions of these stocks, I rely on the Jegadeesh(1989) to indicate 
that time-based variables are unnecessary. Finally I have not included other variables that are, 
unrelated to my hypothesis, but may help build a predictive model based on inefficient stock 
market movement. Isolating for all possible causes of inefficiency in the market is beyond the 
scope of this paper. This study aspires to narrow down on an inefficient model rather than 



















 The results for monthly returns when Twitter is measured as post-2010, 2013, and 2016 
are presented in columns 1,2, and 3 of Table 3, respectively. There are several noteworthy 
results. The cross-term between Twitter and lag returns is negative for all Twitter measurements; 
however it has the largest magnitude for 2013. As expected, late 2013 represents the most 
significant shift between a before Twitter time and an after period time. In other words, a time 
when Twitter had no financial market impact to a time when Twitter could stir up overreaction in 
the stock market. Twitter’s 2013 is marked by further user growth (200 million monthly users), 
maturation of Twitter’s influence in media and across other forms of social media, and finally its 
IPO. LagXTwitter for 2013 has a beta that is slightly over 3 robust standard errors away from the 
null, indicating that with over 99% confidence LagXTwitter can predict future returns. 
This signifies that when associated with the returns of the previous month, the presence 
of Twitter causes stock reversals in the next period. Highly followed companies experience these 
reversals with greater frequency after Twitter than before. Because I find significant results 
through the regression of monthly reversals, this presents the argument that stock reversals occur 
a month after overreaction from Twitter.  
Second, the regression of monthly returns using a 2016 Twitter dummy variable conveys 
similar, yet slightly less significant results. Casual empiricism dictates that LagXTwitter, using 
2016, is not significant at conventional levels because Twitter had already gained notable 
influence by late 2013. However, considering 2016’s dummy variable is still considerable, this 
suggests that the tendency for Twitter to generate overreactions amongst its most followed 
brands is growing. It seems like Twitter’s economic, financial, and political reach is expanding 




Furthermore, Table 4 displays a positive serial correlation between LagXTwitter and 
initial period returns when using weekly returns. Though these coefficients are insignificant by 
conventional standards, their signum suggests that Twitter causes stock return momentum before 
monthly reversals occur. This is consistent with the pattern of individual stock reversals in 
Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009).  
Discussing the other variables of Table 3 and 4, the only other significant variable is Size. 
The positively significant Size variable indicates that when lag equals 0, large companies on 
Twitter have experienced positive returns on average. This result is logically reasonable when I 
consider that companies that have become popular on Twitter and have large market caps have 
probably grown significantly during the recent bull market period. All other variables are 
insignificant; however the signum of variables such as LagXSize and LagXRetail are consistent 
with my rationale for including these variables in my regression, as described above in the 
empirical strategy section. 
 Table 5 displays the results of a similar regression of monthly returns however this time 
only using large lag return datapoints(+/- 0.1). The cross-term between Twitter (2013) and lag 
returns is very statistically significant. It has a t-statistic of approximately -3.4 with a coefficient 
of -0.17. Furthermore, unlike the previous regressions which use all return data, this regression 
yields a statistically significant beta for the cross between Twitter (2016) and lag returns. This 
indicates that Twitter’s tendency to cause overreactions in the returns of the most followed 
companies is more pronounced with large return shifts. My interpretation for these more 
significant results is as follows. As companies draw attention on Twitter, the event that the 
attention is focused around becomes more widely known and frequently retweeted. Therefore, 




overall value of a company. Logically, this exponential effect occurs more with larger events, 
which cause larger initial market reactions.  
 As a final concluding, compared to all other factors that contribute to the direction of a 
stock’s price, the relationship that I have found is still economically insignificant. This intuition 
is corroborated by my regression’s very small R-squared, meaning that the majority of next day 
returns are explained by other unknown variables or are even unexplainable. Thus researching 
other outside information about a company, such as its financial or strategy, is needed to make 



















VII. Robustness Tests 
I also perform a number of robustness tests.  First, as seen in Table 5, in order to measure 
the effect that large market shifts have on next period returns after Twitter, I only include lag 
returns that are below the 10th and above the 90th percentiles of returns in the period between 
2007 and 2019. Table 5 depicts a regression that includes monthly returns and 2013 & 2016 
Twitter dummy variables. However, I actually test the effect of large market shifts in 4 other 
regressions. In addition to using monthly returns and a 2010 Twitter dummy variable, I also use 
large weekly returns and 2010, 2013, and 2016 dummy variables. However, because only the 
regression with monthly returns and 2013 and 2016 Twitter dummy variables yield significant 
results, I elect to only include these two regressions. In my view, this allows for clear 
comparison between the regressions that use all return data and the regression that only used data 
on large return shifts. However, these additional results are available upon request. 
Second, I re-estimate equation 1 adding two additional control variables: a cross-term 
between size, lag returns, and Twitter, and a cross-term between retail, lag returns, and Twitter. I 
hypothesize that these triple cross-term variables may demonstrate how much Twitter’s tendency 
to cause overreaction is because of a company’s size or retail ownership. However, the 
coefficients on these additional cross-terms are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
This suggests that a company’s size or retail ownership do not noticeably affect Twitter’s 
tendency to cause overreactions amongst its most followed companies. Thus, just as the stock 
reactions that Twitter causes are inefficient, the reasons behind these inefficient reactions are 







In the current political and financial age, Twitter has arisen as an important tool for 
politicians and companies to speak with their constituents and customers/investors. Twitter has 
thus become viable information hub because of the previously mentioned direct connection that 
it allows. However, within this hub, third parties constantly exchange ideas, facts, rumors, and 
falsehoods. Oftentimes, rumors appear first on Twitter because of Twitter’s easy and immediate 
disbursement of information, leaving it up to investors to decide if the information that they are 
receiving is true, false, or overexaggerated. Because retail investors most likely are highly 
impressionable, rely on Twitter for information, and are probably unable to differential between 
meaningful trustworthy news and irrelevant unreliable news, Twitter and social media in general 
may instigate inefficient markets. Following this logic, companies with large social media 
audiences experience overreactions in their stock returns. 
Regarding current knowledge on this topic, the literature can be split into two main 
branches: how retail investor’s contribute to overreactions in the returns of individual stock 
returns and how social media sentiment produces overreactions in the market in general. First, 
Shleifer and Summers (1990) represents the foundation of this first branch of literature; in their 
research, they discuss how “noise traders” react based on pseudo-signals as a herd, and that 
arbitrageurs do not leverage this irrational shift because of the risk involved. Barber, Odeon, and 
Zhu (2009) build off of the hypothesis of inefficient markets by relating retail investor activity 
with subsequent rebounds. Thus, the authors support the argument that stocks targeted by retail 
investor activity experience overreactions. Following the branch of literature focused specifically 
on social media’s impact on the market, current knowledge ends with Sul, Dennis, Yuan (2014) 




sentiment on Twitter predicts future returns. Tetlock(2007; 2010) proves that market shifts 
resulting from social media are inefficient by recording rebounds.  
This paper attempts to connect the first branch of literature which states that stocks with 
large retail investor interest experience overreactions and the second branch of knowledge that 
points out that social media causes inefficient shifts of the market. Thus, there is a gap in existing 
knowledge regarding if overreaction due to social media can be predicted in the returns of 
individual stocks. In order to fill this gap, this study focuses on the returns of 19 of the 50 most 
followed brands on Twitter from 2007 to the end of 2019. With the objective to test if Twitter 
can be predictor of future returns, I set up a lag regression, consisting of a Twitter dummy 
variable interacted with previous period returns. The Twitter dummy variable serves to indicate a 
shift from before Twitter’s influence in the stock market to after.  
When the Twitter dummy variable marks 2013 as this shift, my regression results indicate 
that the monthly returns of the most followed companies are negatively predicted by the presence 
of Twitter, when the returns of the previous month are taken into account. I detect a negative 
relationship with 99% certainty. The negative coefficient of this relationship reveals that Twitter, 
and by assumption social media in general, initiates overreactions in the monthly returns of its 
most followed companies. Interestingly, though the relationship between the Twitter dummy and 
future returns in the weekly regression is insignificant, it is positive. This corroborates the 
findings of Barber, Odeon, and Zhu (2009) by indicating that before returns reverse to 
demonstrate overreaction, there could be a period of return momentum. Finally, when only large 
return shifts are used for regression analysis, Twitter’s impact on the overreactions of individual 




As discussed at the end of my results section, due to the economically insignificance of 
the serial correlation between present day returns and the Twitter dummy interacted with lag 
returns, the results of this regression do not substantiate invest strategy changes. This is one of 
the main shortcomings of this paper. In other words, forming an investment strategy to take 
advantage of the discovered overreactions would not result in a positive alpha, especially if this 
strategy were to replace investments based on more comprehensive background research on a 
stock. Another shortcoming to be aware of is the limited amount of companies that could be 
analyzed, because as explained in my data section, few of the top followed companies qualified 
for my regression and the lesser followed companies may not have significant overreactions in 
the market.  
A logical next step after this paper would be a regression that compares companies with 
little or no Twitter following to those that have large Twitter following. Though I initially 
perceived this regression as a more valuable indicator of the effect that Twitter has on individual 
stock returns, I immediately approached roadblocks during my research. It is very difficult to 
find non-Twitter companies that are even slightly comparable to the top followed Twitter 
companies, especially in the US. I discovered a pattern of differences in size, popularity in 
normal media, retail investor following, and financial ratios and reasonably assumed there are 
many more differences between Twitter and non-Twitter companies that would need to be 
controlled for. However, given amble time and resources, this seems like a reasonable step.  
Another path for further research would be to analyze if the degree that stocks trend on 
Twitter after a certain event or incident could dictate how much an individual security’s returns 
overreacted to said event. This could uncover actionable investment strategies for positive alpha, 




idea would be extremely interesting but difficult to explore. Researchers would need to have data 
on when a company trended on Twitter because of a specific event and the company’s stock 
returns that followed. For a reasonable sample size, this would involve the events of numerous 
different companies. To my knowledge, this data does not currently exist, at least publicly.  
Nevertheless, despite the difficulties that I suspect for further research, I believe that 
examining the relationship between social media and stock returns to identify investment 
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